Florida's Pension Election: From DB to DC and Back

Abstract

Abstract During the year 2002, the State of Florida's 600,000 public employees were given the choice of converting their traditional defined benefit (DB) pension plan into an individual‐account defined contribution (DC) plan with full control over asset allocation and investment decisions. To mitigate some of the risk and uncertainty in the decision, the State granted each employee electing the DC plan an additional option to switch back (i.e., change their mind once) at any point prior to retirement. This option has been labeled the 2nd election by the State and the cost of reentry is fixed at the accumulated benefit obligation of their pension entitlement, which is the present value of the life annuity. Our article presents some original analytic insights relating to the optimal time and financial value of this unique 2nd election. Although our model is deterministic in nature, we believe that it provides a number of intuitive insights that are quite robust. Our results can be contrasted with Lachance, Mitchell, and Smetters (2003) . We estimate that the increase in retirement wealth that arises from having the 2nd election is equivalent to at most 30 percent in future value, and only when utilized optimally. Furthermore, for most State employees above the age of 45, the 2nd election has little economic value because the DB plan dominates the DC plan from day one. Of course, it remains to be seen what percent of Florida's 600,000 employees will elect to behave rationally with their newfound pension autonomy.

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