PROTO-EXPERIENCES AND SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCES: CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM CONCEPTS

Abstract

Deterministic reductive monism and non-reductive substance dualism are two opposite views for consciousness, and both have serious problems. An alternative view is needed. For this, we hypothesize that strings or elementary particles (fermions and bosons) have two aspects: (i) elemental proto-experiences (PEs) as phenomenal aspect, and (ii) mass, charge, and spin as material aspect. Elemental PEs are hypothesized to be the properties of elementary particles and their interactions, which are composed of irreducible fundamental subjective experiences (SEs)/PEs that are in superimposed form in elementary particles and in their interactions. Since SEs/PEs are superimposed, elementary particles are not specific to any SE/PE; they (and all inert matter) are carriers of SEs/PEs, and hence, appear as non-experiential material entities. Furthermore, our hypothesis is that matter and associated elemental PEs co-evolved and co-developed into neural-nets and associated neural-net PEs (neural Darminism), respectively. The signals related to neural PEs interact in a neural-net and neural-net PEs emerges from random process of self-organization. The neural-net PEs are a set of SEs embedded in the neural-net by a non-computational or non-algorithmic process. The non-specificity of elementary particles is transformed into the specificity of neural-nets by neural Darwinism. The specificity of SEs emerges when feedforward and feedback signal interacts in the neuropil and are dependent on wakefulness (i.e., activation) attention, re-entry between neural populations, working memory, stimulus at above threshold, and neural net PE signals. This PE-SE framework integrates reductive and non-reductive views, complements the existing models, bridges the explanatory gaps, and minimizes the problem of causation.

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