SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Problem
13 references·16 citing·39 second hop
Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Problem (1994)Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the P…CEO Incentives: It's Not How Much You Pay, But How (1999)CEO Incentives: It's Not How …An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1992)An Analysis of the Principal-…Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives (1990)Performance Pay and Top-Manag…Consumption puzzles and precautionary savings (1990)Consumption puzzles and preca…CEO INCENTIVES — IT'S NOT HOW MUCH YOU PAY, BUT HOW* (1990)CEO INCENTIVES — IT'S NOT HOW…Outside directors and CEO turnover (1988)Outside directors and CEO tur…Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory (1988)Compensation and Incentives: …Labor supply of men: A survey (1987)Labor supply of men: A surveyAggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (1987)Aggregation and Linearity in …Limited liability contracts between principal and agent (1983)Limited liability contracts b…An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1983)An Analysis of the Principal-…THE DEMAND FOR RISKY ASSETS (1977)THE DEMAND FOR RISKY ASSETSAn Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)An Exploration in the Theory …Performance-vesting provisions in executive compensation (2018)Performance-vesting provision…Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer (2016)Executive Compensation: A Mod…Corporate governance, social responsibility information disclosure, and enterprise value in China (2016)Corporate governance, social …Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New Optimal Contracting Theories (2009)Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient…Shareholder Rights, Boards, and CEO Compensation (2008)Shareholder Rights, Boards, a…Firm Value and Managerial Incentives: A Stochastic Frontier Approach* (2005)Firm Value and Managerial Inc…Performance Incentives within Firms: The Effect of Managerial Responsibility (2003)Performance Incentives within…Incentive Compensation When Executives Can Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section (2003)Incentive Compensation When E…Agency theory, performance evaluation, and the hypothetical construct of intrinsic motivation (2002)Agency theory, performance ev…Executive Compensation in the Information Technology Industry (2000)Executive Compensation in the…Executive Compensation: Six Questions that Need Answering (1999)Executive Compensation: Six Q…The Other Side of the Tradeoff: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation (1998)The Other Side of the Tradeof…The Dependence of pay—Performance Sensitivity on the Size of the Firm (1998)The Dependence of pay—Perform…Corporate Governance, Competition, and Performance (1997)Corporate Governance, Competi…Total Board Remuneration and Company Performance (1996)Total Board Remuneration and …Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence (1996)Executive Compensation, Strat…Criteria for Choice Among Risky Ventures (1959)An Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (1973)The Rationale of the Mean-Standard Deviation Analysis, Skewness Preference, and the Demand for Money (1989)Why do people pay taxes? (1992)Economic foundations of cost-effectiveness analysis (1997)Inequality, Social Insurance, and Redistribution (2001)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Agency costs and innovation (1989)Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives (1997)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm (1980)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems (1993)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature (2001)The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation (1988)Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective (1999)Stock prices and top management changes (1988)Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers (1989)The Costs and Benefits of Managerial Incentives and Monitoring in Large U.S. Corporations: When is More not Better? (1994)An examination of the relationship of governance mechanisms to performance (2001)Corporate governance and earnings management at large U.S. bank holding companies (2009)The Nature of the Firm (1937)AFFECT- AND COGNITION-BASED TRUST AS FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERPERSONAL COOPERATION IN ORGANIZATIONS. (1995)The Provision of Incentives in Firms (1999)Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem (2003)On Economic Inequality (1973)Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets (2002)Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence (2009)On the Covariance Structure of Earnings and Hours Changes (1986)On the Covariance Structure of Earnings and Hours Changes (1989)Fiscal Adjustments in OECD Countries: Composition and Macroeconomic Effects (1997)Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms (1986)Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships (1991)The Tenuous Trade‐off between Risk and Incentives (2002)Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors (1996)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1990Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives5,080 cited
  • 1971An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation4,520 cited
  • 1988Outside directors and CEO turnover4,251 cited
  • 1987Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives2,870 cited
  • 1983An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem2,127 cited
  • 1992An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem1,913 cited
  • 1988Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory1,719 cited
  • 1977THE DEMAND FOR RISKY ASSETS1,052 cited
  • 1987Labor supply of men: A survey751 cited
  • 1990CEO INCENTIVES — IT'S NOT HOW MUCH YOU PAY, BUT HOW*602 cited
  • 1990Consumption puzzles and precautionary savings549 cited
  • 1999CEO Incentives: It's Not How Much You Pay, But How544 cited
  • 1983Limited liability contracts between principal and agent520 cited

Cited by

  • 2016Corporate governance, social responsibility information disclosure, and enterprise value in China307 cited
  • 2003Performance Incentives within Firms: The Effect of Managerial Responsibility298 cited
  • 2003

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

Incentive Compensation When Executives Can Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section
295 cited
  • 2016Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer270 cited
  • 2008Shareholder Rights, Boards, and CEO Compensation258 cited
  • 1998The Dependence of pay—Performance Sensitivity on the Size of the Firm254 cited
  • 1996Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence250 cited
  • 1997Corporate Governance, Competition, and Performance240 cited
  • 1998The Other Side of the Tradeoff: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation234 cited
  • 2009Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New Optimal Contracting Theories233 cited
  • 1999Executive Compensation: Six Questions that Need Answering230 cited
  • 1996Total Board Remuneration and Company Performance228 cited
  • 2000Executive Compensation in the Information Technology Industry227 cited
  • 2002Agency theory, performance evaluation, and the hypothetical construct of intrinsic motivation218 cited
  • 2018Performance-vesting provisions in executive compensation215 cited
  • 2005Firm Value and Managerial Incentives: A Stochastic Frontier Approach*214 cited