Robust Inference in Communication Games with Partial ProvabilityBarton L. Lipman, Duane J. Seppi1995-08-01articleJournal of Economic Theory183 citationsclosedNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Game Theory and ApplicationsGame Theory and Voting SystemsAuction Theory and ApplicationsAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 183 citations exist upstream.References1982Strategic Information Transmission1981Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications1981The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality1986Relying on the Information of Interested Parties1991Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium1993Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games1988Subgame Perfect Implementation1981Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric InformationCited by2008Competition and Truth in the Market for News2004The United Nations Security Council and the Rally ’Round the Flag Effect2001Information aggregation in debate: who should speak first?2012MEDIA MERGERS AND MEDIA BIAS WITH RATIONAL CONSUMERS2009Game Theory, Information, and Deliberative Democracy2005Deliberation and Voting Rules2022The fundamental effects of ESG disclosure quality in boosting the growth of ESG investing2000On the economics of trials: adversarial process, evidence, and equilibrium bias