The “Closure” Assumption as a First Step: Neo-Ricardian Economics and Post-Keynesianism

Abstract

In this paper I accept that just as mainstream economics can be characterized by its insistence upon a deductivist method, so the least contentious, most widely accepted aspects of Post-Keynesianism can be accounted for by its anti-deductivist stance and more specifically by its tacit commitment to something like critical realism. I argue that neo- Ricardian economics, to the extent that it takes closure for granted as a natural and useful starting point for analysis, retains an underlying commitment to deductivism and so is difficult to reconcile with Post- Keynesianism. By providing a criterion for assessing whether neo- Ricardianism belongs within a coherent Post-Keynesianism I also clarify why the nature of this rclationship has for so long remained unresolved. Not until it was recognized that coherence within Post-Keynesianism turns upon methodological issues, and essentially involves the abandon- ment of the deductivist framework, could progress in understanding its relationship with neo-Ricardianism be made. Keywords: nco-Ricardianism, deductivism, Post-Keynesianism, critical realism

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