THE COST OF TRANSFERS

Gordon Tullock

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Economic Theory and Institutions Economic and Fiscal Studies Legal and Constitutional Studies

Abstract

Additional discussions of transfers have pointed out that they are essentially costless to society as a whole. This article discusses the investment of resources in obtaining transfers or attempting to avoid transfers away from ego. In any situation in which transfers are likely, it must be assumed that profit-seeking individuals will invest resources in attempting to get them or prevent them, if the transfer is away from some individual. The problem is discussed in the areas of voluntary charity, bargaining, governmental income redistribution, theft, and war.

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1982RENT SEEKING: A SURVEY 1987Hierarchical structure and the social costs of bribes and transfers 2001How corruption in government affects public welfare: A review of theory 1996The efficiency implications of corruption 2009Expectations of government’s response to disaster 2008Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy 1989Policy Review Section 1982Public Choice Theory and Natural Resources: Methodological Explication and Critique

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