'Ought' implies 'can' and the principle of alternate possibilities

Gideon Yaffe

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Free Will and Agency

Abstract

In his paper 'What we are morally responsible for', Harry Frankfurt claims, in passing, that while the 'Frankfurt Counterexamples' are counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, they are not counterexamples to th famous Kantian maxim that 'Ought' implies 'Can'. In an Analysis Paper of a few years ago, David Widerker objected to Frankfurt's claim by arguing that the 'Ought' implies 'Can' maxim entails PAP; hence, counterexamples to PAP are counterexamples to the maxim as well.

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2008‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ and the derivation of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities 2015Collective Responsibility in a Hollywood Standoff 2005PAPistry: Another Defense 2009‘Ought’ Does Not Imply ‘Can’

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