Éthique et expérimentation animale

Abstract

This paper intends to open a debate about scientific experimentation on animals. First, we argue that animals can be the subjects of moral concerns. Therefore biologists cannot do every things with laboratory animals, because they are not tools. Scientific experiments on animals require an ethical evaluation. Then, we carry out a critical survey of ethical theories applied to experimentation on animals. According to kantism, we can have duties towards animals, but they have no rights. So it is right to experiment on animals, but not to hurt them: it is contrary to human dignity. An other theory relies on the concept of animals rights, drawn from Tom Regan's argumentation, according to which some animals are “subjects-of-a-life”, and therefore have an “inherent value”, which we are obliged to respect. Then we examine how utilitarianism can be extended to all sensible beings, and, according to Peter Singer, what are the consequences of such a position upon scientific experimentation. Assuming that animals are feeling beings, but turning down utilitarian consequentialism, Joel Feinberg argues that animals, which are endowed with a “conative life” have “interests”. And so rights capable of protecting those “interests” in well-being are justified. Finally, we study biologist researchers' spontaneous ethical ideas: tinkering between kantism (exprimenting is always justified) and utilitarianism (no useless sufferings) prompts them to make an ethical assesment of experiments by a kind of costs/benefits account. But it seems that laboratories' assistants can be more sensitive to animals' sufferings: more often than not they contest the costs/benefits assesments of researchers. Cet article entend ouvrir un débat sur l'expérimentation animale. Aprés avoir présenté les raisons qui font que l'expérimentation scientifique sur des animaux n'est pas un acte moralement neutre, il procéde a un examen critique des arguments avancés pour la justifier, la condamner ou la régler par des normes. Sont ainsi successivement examinés : la position kantienne (les animaux n'ont pas de droits, mais nous avons des devoirs envers eux) ; les théories qui accordent des droits moraux aux animaux ; l'extension de l'utilitarisme à l'ensemble des êtres sensibles ; le compromis que construit Feinberg en exigeant que soient respectés les intér̂ets de bien-être des animaux dotés d'une « vie conative ». Puis, l'article analyse et critique l'éthique spontanée des chercheurs : un bricolage pragmatique entre une déontologie kantienne et un calcul utilitariste. N'accordant pas de droits aux animaux d'expérience mais reconnaissant que l'expérimentateur a des devoirs, on cherche dans une sorte de calcul coût/avantage, à justifier la souffrance infligée aux animaux, par les conséquences attendues (et bénéfiques) de l'experience.

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