Human Rights Sanctions and International Trade: A Theory of Compatibility

Abstract

This article examines the compliance of unilateral trade sanctions designed to promote human rights abroad with GATT trade liberalization principles. Using examples from US trade measures, the article defines unilateral human rights sanctions as falling into three categories: tailored, semi‐tailored, and general sanctions. The article then evaluates the compliance of these three types of sanctions with the GATT text and recent WTO interpretations. It argues that while the GATT appears to preclude many unilateral human rights trade measures, particularly those involving semi‐tailored and general sanctions, the GATT text reasonably can be read to accommodate certain human rights sanctions. These include those targeting human rights and labor violations that occur in production of goods for export, GSP measures, restrictions on military technology, and general trade measures targeting jus cogens violations such as genocide. The article concludes that such an interpretive approach to the GATT is necessary in order for trade liberalization to develop consistent with fundamental human rights norms and the broader substantive requirements of the international legal system.

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