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This paper investigates the structural determinants of variation in union power across manufacturing industries. Using a pooled sample of unionized establishments from the Expenditure on Employee Compensation Surveys of 1968–72, the author estimates wage equations augmented with measures of product market structure, bargaining structure, and the size distribution of unions. The results suggest that union wage gains are greatest where discretionary pricing power enhances employers' ability to pay and where unions achieve high coverage, practice centralized bargaining, and avoid union fragmentation. On the other hand, centralized bargaining provides no advantage in competitive industries.
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