Authorship of thoughts in thought insertion: What is it for a thought to be one's own?

Max Seeger

24 citations0/0 files storedPhilosophical Psychology

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Mental Health and Psychiatry Philosophy and Theoretical Science Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Abstract

In thought insertion, subjects experience thoughts which they claim not to be their own. What they claim, it is typically said, is that the thought is not theirs in the sense that they are not the agent or author of the thought. But what does it mean to be the agent or author of a thought? The most intuitive idea is that for a thought to be one's own means for the thought to causally originate within the subject. I defend this analysis against rivaling accounts and discuss several challenges that have not been recognized so far.

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1963Actions, Reasons, and Causes 2014The Blue and Brown Books 1961The Causal Theory of Perception 1968Self-Reference and Self-Awareness 2001The Paradox of Self-Consciousness 1999Schizophrenia, the Space of Reasons, and Thinking as a Motor Process 2001Self-reference and self-awareness 2004Neurocognitive Models of Schizophrenia: A Neurophenomenological Critique

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