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Computationally restricted unmediated talk under incomplete information
13 references·1 citing·43 second hop
Computationally restricted unmediated talk under incomplete information (2003)Computationally restricted unmediated tal…Cheap talk in games with incomplete information (2003)Cheap talk in games with inco…Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games (2002)Computational Complexity and …Correlation without Mediation: Expanding the Set of Equilibrium Outcomes by “Cheap” Pre-play Procedures (1998)Correlation without Mediation…One-Shot Public Mediated Talk (1997)One-Shot Public Mediated TalkA Model of Pre-game Communication (1994)A Model of Pre-game Communica…Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune (1992)Fair Distribution Protocols o…Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions (1989)Pre-play communication in two…Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information (1989)Equilibria of the sealed-bid …Cheap talk can matter in bargaining (1989)Cheap talk can matter in barg…Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium (1988)Communication, coordination a…An Approach to Communication Equilibria (1986)An Approach to Communication …Bargaining under Incomplete Information (1983)Bargaining under Incomplete I…Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems (1982)Optimal coordination mechanis…Game Theory with Costly Computation (2008)Game Theory with Costly Compu…The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Optimal Auction Design (1981)Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand? (1999)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies (1974)Strategic Information Transmission (1982)Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited (2006)When Is Shuttle Diplomacy Worth the Commute? Information Sharing through Mediation (2010)Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality (1987)Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information (2003)A commitment folk theorem (2009)Non-Cooperative Games (1951)Non-cooperative games (1989)Sheep in Sheep's clothing: Why security seekers do not fight each other (1997)Deliberative voting (2006)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model (1967)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)Characterization and computation of nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information (1992)Equilibrium Effects of Pay Transparency (2023)Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection (1984)Communication between rational agents (1990)An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication (1995)War, peace, and the size of countries (2004)The Bargaining Problem (1950)The Strategy of Conflict (1960)The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions (1989)A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining (1993)Hierarchy: The Economics of Managing (2016)Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation (1985)Modeling the forms of international cooperation: distribution versus information (1994)Bargaining with Incomplete Information (2001)The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes (2002)11. Extensive Games and the Problem of Information (1953)Do Sunspots Matter? (1983)Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring (1998)The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication (2004)When Can Mediators Build Trust? (2006)Deliberation and Voting Rules (2005)A Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games With Bargaining (2013)Talk Is Cheap (2016)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1982Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems913 cited
  • 1983Bargaining under Incomplete Information620 cited
  • 1986An Approach to Communication Equilibria384 cited
  • 1989Cheap talk can matter in bargaining243 cited
  • 1988Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium209 cited
  • 1989Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information134 cited
  • 1989Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions125 cited
  • 1992Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune124 cited
  • 1994A Model of Pre-game Communication109 cited
  • 2003Cheap talk in games with incomplete information94 cited
  • 2002Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games80 cited
  • 1998Correlation without Mediation: Expanding the Set of Equilibrium Outcomes by “Cheap” Pre-play Procedures61 cited
  • 1997One-Shot Public Mediated Talk47 cited

Cited by

  • 2008Game Theory with Costly Computation37 cited

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