Transparency and Reputation: The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts

Petra M. Geraats

81 citations0/0 files storedTopics in Macroeconomics

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Monetary Policy and Economic Impact Banking stability, regulation, efficiency Economic theories and models

Abstract

Abstract Transparency has become one of the key features of monetary policy. This paper analyzes the reputational incentives related to transparency, focusing on the publication of central bank forecasts. A simple dynamic monetary policy game shows how transparency reduces inflation, as has been found empirically. Furthermore, the endogenous choice of transparency is analyzed. Although transparency exposes weak central banks, the negative market feedback in response to secrecy could provide a sufficiently strong inducement to become transparent. Thus, reputational concerns could lead to transparency, even without formal disclosure requirements.

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References

1977Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans 1981A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model 1997Inflation forecast targeting: Implementing and monitoring inflation targets 2000The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics 1986A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information 1999Inflation targeting: lessons from the international experience 2000Federal Reserve Information and the Behavior of Interest Rates 2002Central Bank Transparency

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2005How transparent are central banks?2015Do Central Bank Forecasts Influence Private Agents? Forecasting Performance versus Signals 2008Central Bank Policy Rate Guidance and Financial Market Functioning 2006Revealing the Secrets of the Temple: The Value of Publishing Central Bank Interest Rate Projections 2005The Mystique of Central Bank Speak 2016

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