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This Essay explores a theme familiar in domestic law that is relatively uncharted in relation to international courts and tribunals—judicial independence. The context for our analysis is the growth of an international judiciary. Over the last decade or so, almost a dozen new standing international courts or tribunals have been established,1 and the scope of judicial activity at the international level has expanded far beyond what might have been envisioned just afteen or twenty years ago. There are more judges, the range of specialized tribunals addressing speciac substantive areas of law has increased, and the range of remedies available has broadened. In some areas, judicial settlement of international disputes is no longer out of the ordinary. Modern international courts and tribunals are diverse in their mandates, structure, and organization.2 International judges are subject to varying means of appointment and to differing terms and conditions of service (e.g., tenure and permissible scope of outside activities). Yet they share a common characteristic insofar as they all at least potentially play a central role in interpreting and applying international law. Judicial independence is recognized to be a signiacant factor in maintaining the credibility and legitimacy of international courts and tribunals. In this Essay we sketch the growth of the international judiciary and highlight certain issues and questions relating to independence and impartiality that are being raised. At least two
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