I—Alex Byrne: Transparency, Belief, Intention

Alex Byrne

105 citations0/0 files storedAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophical Ethics and Theory Philosophy and Theoretical Science

Abstract

This paper elaborates and defends a familiar ‘transparent’ account of knowledge of one's own beliefs, inspired by some remarks of Gareth Evans, and makes a case that the account can be extended to mental states in general, in particular to knowledge of one's intentions.

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References

2000Knowledge and Its Limits 2002Knowledge and its Limits 1991Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.1982The varieties of reference 1991Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.2000The Possibility of Practical Reason 1999How to Defeat Opposition to Moore 1996The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays

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2011II—Matthew Boyle: Transparent Self-Knowledge 2016Transparency and the KK Principle 2011How we know what we intend 2014WHAT DOES KNOWLEDGE-YIELDING DEDUCTION REQUIRE OF ITS PREMISES?2015What asymmetry? Knowledge of self, knowledge of others, and the inferentialist challenge 2014Reasoning and Regress 2019Knowledge from Non-Knowledge 2018

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