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• 1999Chapter 22 Political economics and macroeconomic policy124 cited
• 2001Monetary Policy in the Euro Area: Strategy and Decision-Making at the European Central Bank123 cited
• 2011Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries86 cited
• 2006Optimal Central Bank Design: Benchmarks for the ECB81 cited
• 1991Precommitment by central bank independence79 cited
• 1992The Choice of a Conservative Central Banker in a Multisector Economy71 cited
• 2000A Long History of FOMC Voting Behavior65 cited
• 2000Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis61 cited
• 1995Policymakers, institutions, and central bank decisions50 cited
• 2008Central bank boards around the world: Why does membership size differ?46 cited
• 1997Partisan control of the money supply and decentralized appointment powers46 cited
• 1991Central Bank Independence: Issues and Experience44 cited
• 2009Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union34 cited
• 2004Central Bank Design in General Equilibrium33 cited
• 1994Designing a Central Bank in a Federal System: The Deutsche Bundesbank, 1957-1992