Stop the Presses! I Think My Research Is Pseudoempirical

Abstract

I had a curious reaction to Jan Smedslund's article, Pseudoempirical in Psychology and the Case for Psychologic-I knew I guilty! If I properly understand what constitutes pseudoempirical research, then a few of my inpress studies are themselves pseudoempirical. Should I rush to withdraw these articles from publication? Surely, after reading Smedslund's article, one understands pseudoempirical research to represent inappropriate efforts. In the abstract, he states, formalization [psychologic; PL] allows one to distinguish between the a priori/noncontingent and the empirical/contingent and hence to discover and prevent pseudoempirical Should I attempt to stop the presses, and prevent what might be a potentially embarrassing situation for me, not to mention shielding the scientific community from more misguided, pseudoempirical research? A clue to my solution to this dilemma came when I realized that, although I recognized that I was of pseudoempirical research, I did not feel guilty about those pseudoempirical research efforts. We've all experienced the pain and embarrassment that follows a critique of our research (by a colleague or a reviewer) wherein some fatal flaw to our study is brought to light. How could we have been so stupid, we think, to have missed that problem? But my realization, that own research might be pseudoempirical, produced none of those expected, negative emotions. Why would I be untroubled that research that Smedslund apparently feels should be prevented would be made public and associated with my name? The answer to that question requires a distinction between research that seeks to demonstrate empirical/contingent relationships (the overwhelming majority of psychological studies, which is the type of research Smedslund has in mind in his article) and a small number of studies undertaken for other (also scientifically appropriate) purposes. But in order to properly flesh out this distinction, I need to take you into the very bowels of a current philosophical/methodological/empirical controversy in psychological research.

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