The Rebound of Private Zoning: Property Rights and Local Governance in Urban Land Use

Abstract

NIMBY and regulatory takings are two well-known phenomena associated with land-use change in US cities. I claim that both are manifestations of what economists refer to as a ‘hold-up problem’ and analyze how fast-growing private zoning, namely the ground-lease system and common interest developments, have evolved to respond to these problems. My argument is based on two spatial facts: the consumption of local collective goods is bundled with land and property; property owners have only limited ex post mobility. By comparing five different combinations of property rights and land use control, I submit that private zoning is most efficient in relieving the agency problem in urban land use. Policy implications of NIMBY and equity issues of private zoning are also discussed.

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