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No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game · Study

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ArticleNo pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game

Robert T. Boyd1987

Article1987

No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game

Robert T. Boyd · Jeffrey P. Lorberbaum

423 citations·0/0 files stored·Nature

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Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation Game Theory and Applications Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

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1989The evolution of indirect reciprocity 2003A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity 2001The Evolution of Norms 2002An evidential model of distributed reputation management 1990The evolution of stochastic strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma 2012Direct reciprocity in structured populations 1993Evolving Behaviors in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma 2002Computational models of trust and reputation : agents, evolutionary games, and social networks

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Year1987

Typearticle

Published1987-05-01

VenueNature

ISSN-L0028-0836

Languageen

Citations423

Files0 public / 0

ShelfEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

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doi10.1038/327058a0

openalex_workW2053845340

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