NORM ENFORCEMENT: ANGER, INDIGNATION, OR RECIPROCITY?

Jeffrey P. Carpenter · Peter Hans Matthews

120 citations0/0 files storedJournal of the European Economic Association

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Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems Social Power and Status Dynamics

Abstract

The enforcement of social norms often requires that unaffected third parties sanction offenders. Given the renewed interest of economists in norms, the literature on third-party punishment is surprisingly thin. In this paper, we report the results of an experiment designed to replicate the anger-based punishment of directly affected second parties and evaluate two distinct explanations for third-party punishment: indignation and group reciprocity. We find evidence in favor of both, with the caveat that the incidence of indignation-driven sanctions is perhaps smaller than earlier studies have hinted. Furthermore, our results suggest that second parties use sanctions to promote conformism while third parties intervene primarily to promote efficiency.

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References

2000Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments 2003The nature of human altruism 19952. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research 2001Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment 2001In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies 1986Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics 2004Third-party punishment and social norms 1992Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible

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