Article1997

Are Hypothetical Referenda Incentive Compatible?

264 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Political Economy

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Economic and Environmental Valuation Game Theory and Voting Systems Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Abstract

Hypothetical referenda have been proposed as an incentive‐compatible mechanism that can be used to obtain social valuations of environmental resources. We employ experimental methods to test the hypothesis that such referenda are indeed incentive compatible. Our results lead us to reject that hypothesis.

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References

1973Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result 1975Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions 1988Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making 2006Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory 1972Estimating demand for public goods: An experiment 1987Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions 1994Hypothetical Surveys and Real Economic Commitments

Cited by

2002Alternative Non-market Value-Elicitation Methods: Are the Underlying Preferences the Same?2008Chapter 81 Experimental Evidence on the Existence of Hypothetical Bias in Value Elicitation Methods 2003Contingent Valuation in Practice 2002Provision Point Mechanisms and Field Validity Tests of Contingent Valuation 2014Consequentiality: A Theoretical and Experimental Exploration of a Single Binary Choice 2004Explaining Disparities between Actual and Hypothetical Stated Values: Further Investigation Using Meta-Analysis 2004The effect of varying the causes of environmental problems on stated WTP values: evidence from a field study 2006Experimental Evidence on Alternative Environmental Valuation Methods

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