A science of meaning: Can behaviorism bring meaning to psychological science?

Abstract

An argument is presented for making meaning a central dependent variable in psychological science. Principles of operant psychology are then interpreted as providing a basic foundation for a science of meaning. The emphasis here is on the generality of basic operant concepts, where learning is a process of meaning making that is governed largely by natural contingencies; reinforcement is an organic process in which environment-behavior relations are selected, defined here as a dialectical process of meaning making; and reinforcers are experiential consequences with acquired, ecologically derived meanings. The author concludes with a call for a more interdisciplinary science of psychology, focusing on the individual in society.

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