Did Descartes Have a Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception?

Abstract

Did Descartes Have a Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception?' RONALD ARBINI IT IS ALL but universally acknowledged among readers of Descartes that he either consciously maintained or was somehow committed to one or another form of perceptual representationalism. The justification for this interpretation almost always involves citing one or another of a host of more or less obscure and often inconsistent references to ideas, their content, causes, resemblances (or the lack of same) to thoughts (obscure), images, pictures, engravings, etc. in the Meditations and related philosophical texts. It is also widely acknowledged by those who cite such references seeking an obvious, coherent or clearly consistent expression of perceptual representationalism in Descartes's philosophical texts that none can be found. ~ In contrast to this interpretation, it will be argued below that the only clear coherent account of sense perception to be found in Descartes is not to ' I wish to express my thanks to my colleague Professor N. W. Gilbert for translating various passages discussed below. His contributions to the cited translations are contained in brackets. Alternate translations are contained in square brackets. Further thanks are due to my Berkeley colleague Professor Janet Broughton f'or her helpful critical comments on an early draft. Finally, thanks are due to Professor Fred Berger of U.C. Davis, and a referee of this journal for valuable criticisms contributing to the clarification and editing of the last draft of this article. See for example: B. Williams, Descartes, The Project of Pure Enquiry (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979) pp. 985-6 A. J. P. Kenny, Descartes (New York: Random House 1968 ), Pp. lo5ff. M. D. Wilson Descartes(London, Henly and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Pau, 1978) p. 2o3. It should be noticed that each of the above has expressed some hesitation over attributing to Descartes a clearly consistent or obvious doctrine of the relationship between ideas of sense and what or how they are supposed to represent. In fact Wilson wonders whether any philosophical causal or representational theory can be attributed to Descartes at all because his "meager" conclusions in the Meditations concerning this relationship are "too tenuous, too nearly void of cognitive significance." [3~7] 318 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY be found in his philosophical works, but only in his Dioptrics and related "scientific" texts. In this connection it will be argued further, both that Descartes intended this theory to solve the well-known problems impugning "external" sense perception advanced, but never resolved in his philosophical works, and that such a theory cannot be regarded as a form of representationalism . I will first consider the issue of how his "scientific" account of perception can be understood as the only acount of sense perception clearly formulated by Descartes to provide solutions to all of the philosophical puzzles specifically intended to introduce perceptional doubts. Finally, I wilt discuss the question of perceptual representationalism in Descartes and some remaining related issues. I At the time he concluded the sixth Meditation it seems to have escaped Descartes's attention that although he could be taken to have dispatched the evil demon and the dream puzzle, thus ruling out the possibility of universal and systematic deception, this alone fails to account for his puzzles of perception which do not depend for their force upon the prospect of such complete and universal deception. That is, the puzzles of "internal" and "external" perception introduced in the Meditations remain unaffected by removing the possibility of systematic universal deception; for it is clear that despite this possibility it remains possible that one will continue to take round towers for square ones, "perceive" the size of the observed sun to be that of a closely held coin or candle flame, mislocate the origin of a pain in a "phantom limb", etc. In this way, the puzzles of perception introduced in the Meditations, and related philosophical texts remain unaffected by the removal of doubts eminating from considerations involving demons, deceivers, and dreams. That is, the possibility, introduced in Meditation I, that being deceived , after the manner of the above puzzles, is sufficient grounds for not placing complete trust in the senses alone, remains a possibility at the close of the Meditations. In short, at the close of...

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