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THE BIASES OF FEDERAL RESERVE BANK PRESIDENTS

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References

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Cited by

1995Policymakers, institutions, and central bank decisions50 cited
2012Do Federal Reserve presidents communicate with a regional bias?43 cited
2023The Partisanship of Financial Regulators42 cited
2017Influence of regional cycles and personal background on FOMC members’ preferences and disagreement38 cited
2013Forecast dispersion, dissenting votes, and monetary policy preferences of FOMC members: the role of individual career characteristics and political aspects36 cited
2015The influence of FOMC member characteristics on the monetary policy decision-making process32 cited

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2020Is there a limit on FOMC dissents? Evidence from the Greenspan era26 cited

1999EMU25 cited

2017Regional banking instability and FOMC voting18 cited

2017Inconsistent voting behaviour in the FOMC17 cited

2004Individuals, Institutions, and Inflation: Conceptual Complexity, Central Bank Independence, and the Asian Crisis13 cited

2014Inflated Expectations: How Government Partisanship Shapes Monetary Policy Bureaucrats’ Inflation Forecasts11 cited