Politics of Natural Resource Use in Cambodia

Abstract

Natural resources are neither a blessing nor a curse; intrinsically they can neither positively nor negatively affect political and economic developments. Rather, the negative effects of natural resources are correlated with a country's “structured contingency”: the existing political configuration through which the oil revenue is managed and spent. Cambodia's political configuration is dominated by interlocking patron-client networks that require a leader to capture and maintain the loyalty of key sections of the politico-commercial elite by fulfilling their material aspirations through the distribution of perquisites. Under these conditions, corruption is widespread, the government institutions are unresponsive, and resources are misallocated. Examining the existing political configuration and the precedent set by the forest and land sectors, this article argues that future oil revenue will likely be used partly for self-enrichment of the political elites and partly to promote political legitimacy of the ruling elites through the politics of gift giving and patronage. The situation will likely have two significant impacts on Cambodia: (1) inequitable development and increased income inequality and (2) perpetuation of Cambodia's hybrid democracy, preventing any further movement toward democratic consolidation.

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