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The core of a simple game with ordinal preferences
4 references·0 citing·15 second hop
The core of a simple game with ordinal preferences (1975)The core of a simple game with ordinal pr…Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)Theory of games and economic …The game-theoretic structure of Arrow's general possibility theorem (1972)The game-theoretic structure …Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions (1969)Quasi-Transitivity, Rational …Stability in Voting (1961)Stability in VotingTheory of Games and Economic Behavior (1947)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)An Axiomatic Theory of Tournament Aggregation (1978)Arrovian Social Choice on Economic Domains (1997)Chapter 1 Impossibility theorems in the arrovian framework (2002)Foundations of Economic Analysis. (1948)The Theory of Committees and Elections. (1959)The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal (1970)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Group preference aggregation methods employed in AHP: An evaluation and an intrinsic process for deriving members' weightages (1994)Toward a positive theory of consumer choice (1980)Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk (1988)Non-cooperative games (1989)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)
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References

  • 2019Theory of games and economic behavior16,777 cited
  • 1969Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions318 cited
  • 1961Stability in Voting189 cited
  • 1972The game-theoretic structure of Arrow's general possibility theorem65 cited

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