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Debt and warrants: Agency problems and mechanism design
16 references·3 citing·42 second hop
Debt and warrants: Agency problems and mechanism design (1992)Debt and warrants: Agency problems and me…Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt (1997)Default and Renegotiation: A …The Loan Commitment as an Optimal Financing Contract (1991)The Loan Commitment as an Opt…A Solution to the Problem of Externalities When Agents Are Well-Informed (1991)A Solution to the Problem of …Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices (1990)Limited liability and incenti…Optimal Investment with Stock Repurchase and Financing as Signals (1989)Optimal Investment with Stock…Subgame Perfect Implementation (1988)Subgame Perfect ImplementationAdvances in Economic Theory (1988)Advances in Economic TheoryThe theory of contracts (1987)The theory of contractsEfficient Financing Under Asymmetric Information (1987)Efficient Financing Under Asy…Efficient Financing under Asymmetric Information (1987)Efficient Financing under Asy…Competition, risk neutrality and loan commitments (1987)Competition, risk neutrality …Agency Problems and Financial Contracting. (1987)Agency Problems and Financial…Agency problems and financial contracting (1987)Agency problems and financial…The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (1986)The Costs and Benefits of Own…Investment incentives, debt, and warrants (1984)Investment incentives, debt, …Determinants of corporate borrowing (1977)Determinants of corporate bor…Security design for a non-standard IPO: The case of SPACs (2016)Security design for a non-sta…CONVERTIBLE DEBT FINANCING: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1996)CONVERTIBLE DEBT FINANCING: A…Chapter 22 Corporate financial structure, incentives and optimal contracting (1995)Chapter 22 Corporate financia…The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance (2003)Financing and Advising: Optimal Financial Contracts with Venture Capitalists (2003)Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Securities (2003)The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment (1958)Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares (1961)The Capital Structure Puzzle (1984)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)Job Market Signaling (1973)Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Debt Versus Equity under Asymmetric Information (1988)Share Repurchase and Takeover Deterrence (1991)Information production, dilution costs, and optimal security design (2001)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents (1984)Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts (1999)A crash course in implementation theory (2001)Incentives Between Firms (and Within) (2005)The Nature of the Firm (1937)The Problem of Social Cost (1960)Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process (1978)Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives (1991)The quality of government (1999)The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead (2000)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Toward a theory of competitive market signaling: A research agenda (1991)Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling (2001)Private equity returns and disclosure around the world (2009)Chapter 5 Implementation theory (2002)Chapter 18 Philanthropy (2006)Experimental Evidence on Alternative Environmental Valuation Methods (2006)The Socialist System (1992)Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence (1997)Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand? (1999)A Liquidity-based Model of Security Design (1999)Relational Incentive Contracts (2003)Managerial Ownership and Accounting Conservatism (2008)Agent and Principal (1987)Debt, Agency Costs, and Industry Equilibrium (1991)Debt Capacity, Cost of Debt, and Corporate Insurance (2008)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1977Determinants of corporate borrowing13,160 cited
  • 1986The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration9,369 cited
  • 1987The theory of contracts1,330 cited
  • 1990Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices925 cited
  • 1984Investment incentives, debt, and warrants691 cited
  • 1988Subgame Perfect Implementation463 cited
  • 1987Efficient Financing under Asymmetric Information431 cited
  • 1989Optimal Investment with Stock Repurchase and Financing as Signals292 cited
  • 1987Agency Problems and Financial Contracting.241 cited
  • 1991A Solution to the Problem of Externalities When Agents Are Well-Informed240 cited
  • 1988Advances in Economic Theory198 cited
  • 1987Competition, risk neutrality and loan commitments170 cited
  • 1997Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt124 cited
  • 1987Agency problems and financial contracting104 cited
  • 1987Efficient Financing Under Asymmetric Information91 cited
  • 1991The Loan Commitment as an Optimal Financing Contract

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Cited by

  • 2016Security design for a non-standard IPO: The case of SPACs26 cited
  • 1995Chapter 22 Corporate financial structure, incentives and optimal contracting23 cited
  • 1996CONVERTIBLE DEBT FINANCING: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS20 cited