Moral hazard, optimal unemployment insurance, and experience ratingCheng Wang, Stephen D. Williamson2002-10-01articleJournal of Monetary Economics119 citationsclosedNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Labor market dynamics and wage inequalityFinancial Literacy, Pension, Retirement AnalysisRetirement, Disability, and EmploymentAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 119 citations exist upstream.References1986Theory ahead of business-cycle measurement1995Industry-Specific Human Capital: Evidence from Displaced Workers1998The European Unemployment Dilemma1987On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting1997Optimal Unemployment Insurance1994The Consumption Smoothing Benefits of Unemployment Insurance1992On Efficient Distribution with Private Information1992The Role of Unemployment Insurance in an Economy with Liquidity Constraints and Moral Hazard