La decisione in economia tra razionalità ed evoluzione teorica

Abstract

The main research on the cognitive foundations of the economy has claimed for years that there is a clear separation between the theory of economic rationality and the psychology of reasoning and economic decision. The relationship between the two disciplines is becoming increasingly cogent and contaminant. Economics offers normative theories about what it means to decide rationally. Psychology offers an explanation as to why the average individual often makes irrational decisions. The role of intuition in decision-making as well as the effect of emotions are also of significant relevance. The theme of rationality, having to encompass both Economics and Psychology is best addressed by limiting the definitions of the term ‘rational’, which in its common usage is used for ‘reasonable’ and/or ‘acceptable to reason’. Economics and psychology may agree on a point of coherence rather than one of substance (Legrenzi e Girotto, 1996). In general, according to orthodox theory, one of the root causes of the presumed failures of human decision processes is the notion of ‘Bounded Rationality’ (Simon, 1972). It is from this concept that we have started to conduct our analysis on the complexity of economic phenomena and processes that guide the choices of individuals, mindful of the contaminant relationship between economics and psychology.

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