The Externalist's Demon

Clayton Littlejohn

29 citations0/0 files storedCanadian Journal of Philosophy

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy and Theoretical Science Embodied and Extended Cognition

Abstract

Let's say that two individuals are epistemic counterparts iff they happen to be in precisely the same (non-factive) mental states. If one has a veridical experience, her counterparts will undergo a subjectively indistinguishable conscious experience. If she remembers something, her counterparts will seem to recall the same event or fact. If she knows something to be true, her counterparts will believe it to be true. Counterparts always find the same things intuitive. Any difference between those who know a great deal about the external world and their systematically deceived counterparts is a difference the deceived counterparts could never appreciate.

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References

2000Knowledge and Its Limits 2002Knowledge and its Limits 1987Epistemology and Cognition 1979What is Justified Belief?1989Epistemology and Cognition.1984Justification and truth 2008Knowledge and Action 1988How to be a Fallibilist

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2013Epistemological Disjunctivism and the New Evil Demon

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