Ironies of post‐cold war structural adjustment in Sierra Leone

Abstract

Africa's creditors stress ‘capacity building’ measures to strengthen bureaucratic effectiveness to reverse economic and political decline (Dia, 1993). World Bank officials point to the East Asian example of success at using government policies and institutions to promote ‘market friendly’ growth policies insulated from the pressures of clients demanding payouts as a positive example for Africa (World Bank, 1993a). Analysts recognise, however, that decades of patron‐client politics and intractable rent‐seeking (the use of state resources for personal gain) behaviour among state officials limits short‐term prospects for increasing revenue collection. With little internal financing for market boosting policies, World Bank programmes prescribe extensive civil service layoffs. Subsequent reductions in unproductive expenditures will reduce corruption, balance national budgets and remove obstacles to private market growth. Economic growth will in turn produce a class of entrepreneurs to demand more policies and slimmed down bureaucracies to enhance economic efficiency. This ‘growth coalition’ will identify their interests with those of cost‐effective technocratic administrators (World Bank, 1994a:10–3).

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