The Convergence of Praxis and Theoria in Aristotle

Abstract

The Convergence of Praxis and Theoria in Aristotle SCOTT M. DEHART THE INCREASING CRYSTALLIZATIONof the distinction between praxis and theoria that was made by Greek philosophy from Xenophanes to Aristotle would become one of the determinate characteristics of Western thought up to the present day. In Aristotle and others, this distinction would come to take the form of an alternative between two styles of human existence (ethos): the bios theOr~tikos and the bios praktikos. As noted by Georg Picht, 1 in Aristotle's case this distinction had the effect of opposing the divine to the human life and also served to express a certain catharsis of human passions that allowed a pathway to divine praxis. Much of the literature on the subject has focused on this oppositional sense, which leads necessarily to such considerations as: which form of life is subordinate to the other; whether one form is merely instrumental in regard to obtaining the other; and, whether the two lives can be combined in an individual in such a way as to obtain eudaimonia. These are discussions, in other words, that remain primarily within the ambit of ethical discourse, as regarding a fundamental choice in styles of life. Numerous commentators have weighed the relative merits of these two manners of living; a small sample of these would include J. L. Ackrill with his "inclusivist" view of eudaimonia, Amelie O. Rorty with a stress on the complementary aspects of theoria and praxis, as well as the discussions along similar lines by Sarah Broadie and A. W. H. Adkins.' Others have focused on the nature of the respective ends of theoria and praxis: Eugene Garver, who traces a genetic move from instrumental to intrinsic ends, and the work of C. D. C. Reeve and "Der Sinn der Unterscheidung von Theorie und Praxisin der griechischenPhiiosophie,"in Georg Picht, Wahrheit, Vernunfl, Verantwortung (Stuttgart, ~969),1~9-32. 'J. L. Ackrill,"Aristotle on Eudaimonia," Proceedingsof the British Academy LX (1974);Amelie O. Rorty, "The Place of Centemplation in Aristotle'sNichomachean Ethics," in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. AmelieO. Rorty (Berkeley, 198o),377-94; Sarah Broadie,Ethics with Aristotle (Oxford, 1990, 366-438; Arthur W. H. Adkins,Merit and Responsiblity (Chicago,1975),344-54. [7] 8 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:1 JANUARY a995 Richard Kraut.s Edward Halper seeks a rational underpinning to otherwise endoxic and arbitrary ethical principles.4 Finally, a number of writers seek to work out the basis of the distinction (here, the related one of energia and kin~sis) in terms of grammatical tense.5 The wide extension of this oppositional relation of theoria and praxis results in the view, already expressed by Werner Jaeger, that Aristotle to some extent split ethics away from its mooring in metaphysics. 6 This view is hardly inconsequential. It could be seen as resulting in the loss of the hierarchical system of the sciences, in the loss of architectonic wisdom, and in the orphaning of the compartmental sciences, with the subsequent devaluation of the contemplative-philosophical life ideal. But there is a sense in which Aristotle uses the pair theoria/praxis as a transcategorical metaphysical principle that transcends its local and oppositional use in the realm of an ethics of fundamental lifestyle choice. As such, it can apply more broadly to disciplines such as physics, theology, and politics , among others. In this broader sense the pair theoria/praxis is paralleled by other analogous metaphysical pairs such as energeia/dynamis, immobility/ mobility, and even leisure/occupation. These cannot be conceived of as modal oppositions; they are functional pairs which have homologous but differing application in differing ontological strata and disciplines. These differing applications should not be seen as "mere" equivocations, but as constructive ones, which allow for Aristotle's well-known predisposition for the via media. These concepts also allow for the inherent appreciation of dynamism in Aristotle's thought, and for the restless analogical extension of basic concepts across categorical boundaries (a procedure not ungermane to the methods of 3Eugene Garver, "Aristotle's Genealogy of Morals," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XLIV (1984): 471-92; C. D. C. Reeve,Practices of Reason (Oxford, 1992),99-138; Richard Kraut, Aristotle on the...

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