Models of Capital Investments with Private Information and Incentives: a Selective Review

Rick Antle · John C. Fellingham

68 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Business Finance &amp Accounting

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Capital Investment and Risk Analysis Corporate Finance and Governance Game Theory and Applications

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to selectively review research that addresses capital budgeting decisions in settings characterized by dispersed information and incentive problems. The papers are theoretical; they formulate and analyze models that vary in the number of periods considered, the number of economic actors involved, and the number of alternative projects available. The aims of the review are to describe some of the formulations that have been studied, to highlight their key economic and mathematical properties, to reveal their common economic forces, and to collect and organize their basic results.

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2001Option Value to Waiting Created by a Control Problem 2018Honesty in budgeting: a review of morality and control aspects in the budgetary slack literature 2009Hurdle Rates and Project Development Efforts 1999Selection from Many Investments with Managerial Private Information*2006Economics in Management Accounting 2010The Effects of Corporate Governance on Earnings Quality: Evidence from Iran 2001Information systems, incentives and the timing of investments 2010The Effects of Aggregation and Timing on Budgeting: An Experiment

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