Does Luck Exclude Control?

Elesha J. Coffman

44 citations0/0 files storedAustralasian Journal of Philosophy

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophical Ethics and Theory Free Will and Agency

Abstract

Many think that luck excludes control—roughly, that an event is lucky for you only if the event is beyond your control. Jennifer Lackey [2008 Lackey, Jennifer. 2008. What Luck is Not. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 86(2): 255–267. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]] argues against such a requirement on luck. I show that Lackey's argument fails. I also consider a novel argument against such requirements that differs from—but ultimately fares no better than—Lackey's argument.

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References

1971Conclusive reasons 1987Luck and Moral Responsibility 2006Why epistemologists are so down on their luck 2008What Luck is Not 2006Thinking about luck 1995A SECOND PARADOX CONCERNING RESPONSIBILITY AND LUCK 1991MORAL AND EPISTEMIC LUCK 1993On the Transfer of Necessity

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2013Is Safety In Danger?2011Anti-luck Epistemology, Pragmatic Encroachment, and True Belief

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