An Application of the Aumann-Shapley Prices for Cost Allocation in Transportation Problems

Dov Samet · Yair Tauman · Israël Zang

75 citations0/0 files storedMathematics of Operations Research

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Abstract

The Aumann-Shapley (A-S) prices are axiomatically determined on certain classes of piecewise continuously differentiable cost functions. One of these classes consists of all cost functions derived from the transportation problems and some of their generalizations. These prices are used here to allocate costs among destinations in a way that each destination will pay its “real part” in the total transportation costs. An economic transportation model is presented in which the A-S prices are compatible with consumer demands. Finally an algorithm is provided to calculate both the optimal solution and the associated A-S prices for transportation problems.

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2015Values of Non-Atomic Games 1982Allocation of Shared Costs: A Set of Axioms Yielding A Unique Procedure 1978Internal Telephone Billing Rates—A Novel Application of Non-Atomic Game Theory 1982Demand Compatible Equitable Cost Sharing Prices

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