Political Institutions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the U.S. Historical Record

Robert P. Inman · Michael A. Fitts

159 citations0/0 files storedThe Journal of Law Economics and Organization

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Fiscal Policies and Political Economy Economic and Fiscal Studies Local Government Finance and Decentralization

Abstract

Robert P. Inman, Michael A. Fitts; Political Institutions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the U.S. Historical Record, The Journal of Law, Economics, and O

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 159 citations exist upstream.

Cited by

1998Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government 2002Comportamento Estratégico em Presidencialismode Coalizão: As Relações entre Executivo e Legislativo na Elaboração do Orçamento Brasileiro 2004The Cost of Governing 2001Does Direct Democracy Reduce Public Debt Evidence from Swiss Municipalities 1998Individuals, Institutions, and Public Preferences over Public Finance 2004Strong politicians, small deficits: evidence from Norwegian local governments 1994Reflections on Distributive Politics and Universalism 2008Do large cabinets favor large governments? Evidence on the fiscal commons problem for Swiss Cantons

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.