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How Much Common Belief Is Necessary for a Convention? · Study

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ArticleHow Much Common Belief Is Necessary for a Convention?

Hyun Song Shin1996

Article1996

How Much Common Belief Is Necessary for a Convention?

Hyun Song Shin · Timothy L. Williamson

63 citations·0/0 files stored·Games and Economic Behavior

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Game Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

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References

1970Convention: A Philosophical Study.1976Agreeing to Disagree 2004Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model 1968Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points 1977The Emergence of Norms 1992The electronic mail game: Strategic behavior under “almost common knowledge”1989Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs 1995p-Dominance and Belief Potential

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2005Imperfect common knowledge and the information value of prices

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Year1996

Typearticle

Published1996-04-01

VenueGames and Economic Behavior

ISSN-L0899-8256

Languageen

Citations63

Files0 public / 0

ShelfGame Theory and Applications

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doi10.1006/game.1996.0036

openalex_workW2064858754

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