A phenomenological argument for stage theory

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Philosophy and Theoretical Science Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Abstract

This paper presents an argument that the way we experience time is more consistent with our being instantaneous objects than with our being temporally extended throughout our entire lifetimes. By argument to the best explanation therefore, experiencing subjects persons are stages, rather than worms.

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References

1971Personal Identity 1996All the world's a stage 2004How Things Persist 2002‘Thank Goodness That’s Over’: The Evolutionary Story 2011EXPERIENCE AND THE PASSAGE OF TIME 2000The Stage View and Temporary Intrinsics

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