Democracy in an information society

Abstract

The potential impact of managing large organizations, enterprises, and government departments through the universal adoption of computer‐based techniques is analyzed. Current soft and hardware architecture tends to support a centralizing power strategy. Also, the economics of that architecture tend to support centralized rather than distributed and decentralized organizations. This trend may be further supported by dominant Reinforcement Politics. As one byproduct, centralization decreases the possibility of forming a more broadly based consensus. Opportunities for democratic organizational processes are diminished when computerized procedures deny members or citizens the ability to define their way of organizational life by constraining actions that are largely voluntary. Democratic styles may be further constricted when access to information and to foci of decisions is made more difficult. It is not yet clear just how managing single‐issue adherents by means of special lists and letters as part of electoral processes will affect party and coalition politics. There is agreement that computers enhance the possibility of surveillance of citizens and organizations. However, there is controversy whether that surveillance poses threats to individual freedoms that differ from traditional means of coercion. Yet all known instances of surveillance seem to have been initiated by administrative fiat and in the absence of legislated controls or accountability. Somewhat unclear is the effect of computers on the apparent link between more or less free markets and democratic government. Also unclear is the possible destabilizing effect of large‐scale technological unemployment on the politics of democratic countries. All in all, while there are indications that computer‐based technologies tend to have antidemocratic political impact, their influence seems to be cushioned by the process by which democracies are sustained.

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