Organization Theory and Federalism: Interorganizational Networks and the Political Economy of The Federalist

Abstract

The Federalist collection of papers, written by three co-founders of the American Constitution, Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, appeared periodically in 1787 and 1788 in New York. The papers were an attempt to persuade the polity of a pivotal state to accept a new form of government. This article is a theoretical inquiry into the congruence of The Federalist to modern concerns of organization theory. Its purpose is to look at this conceptual cornerstone of American government as a guide for the design and reorganization of present-day public organizations. The article points out areas of concern to modern administration and then links The Federalist logic to them through the notion of interorganizational networks. Following this, this article illustrates the congruency by addressing the problems of differentiation and integration. Some might view The Federalist as limited to the American setting, but in fact its creation occurred in light of European precedents and the rise of the administrative state. It, therefore, holds significance for the more general interests of administrative theory.

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