The most influential arguments for scientific realism remain centrally concerned with an inference from scientific success to the approximate truth of successful theories. Recently, however, and in response to antirealists' objections from radical discontinuity within the history of science, the arguments have been refined. Rather than target entire theories, realists narrow their commitments to only certain parts of theories. Despite an initial plausibility, the selective realist strategy faces significant challenges. In this article, I outline four prerequisites for a successful selective realist defence and argue that adopting a comparative sense of success both satisfies those requirements and partially in consequence provides a more compelling, albeit more modest, realist thesis. 1 Introduction 2 Requisites for a Selective Realist Defence 3 Success, Progress, and a New Selective Realist Thesis 3.1 A new way for realists to think about scientific success 3.2 Distinguishing two realist commitments 3.3 A new selective realist thesis 3.4 For convergence and against relying on explanatory virtues 4 Requisites for a Selective Realist Defence Revisited 5 Historical Sketches 5.1 Optical aether theories 5.2 Phlogiston theory 5.3 Darwin, Galton, and Weissmann on generation and inheritance 5.4 Stability across theory change 6 Conclusions
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