Articlegreen2009

The private rejection of unfair offers and emotional commitment

Toshio Yamagishi · Yutaka Horita · Haruto Takagishi · Mizuho Shinada · Shigehito Tanida · Karen Schweers Cook

217 citations0/0 files storedProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

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Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Abstract

In a series of experiments, we demonstrate that certain players of an economic game reject unfair offers even when this behavior increases rather than decreases inequity. A substantial proportion (30-40%, compared with 60-70% in the standard ultimatum game) of those who responded rejected unfair offers even when rejection reduced only their own earnings to 0, while not affecting the earnings of the person who proposed the unfair split (in an impunity game). Furthermore, even when the responders were not able to communicate their anger to the proposers by rejecting unfair offers in a private impunity game, a similar rate of rejection was observed. The rejection of unfair offers that increases inequity cannot be explained by the social preference for inequity aversion or reciprocity; however, it does provide support for the model of emotion as a commitment device. In this view, emotions such as anger or moral disgust lead people to disregard the immediate consequences of their behavior, committing them to behave consistently to preserve integrity and maintain a reputation over time as someone who is reliably committed to this behavior.

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References

1999A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation 2000ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition 1982An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining 2011Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics 2003Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction 1989Passions within reason: the strategic role of the emotions 2005A theory of reciprocity 1994Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments

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