The Anthropocentric Paradigm and the Possibility of Animal Ethics

Abstract

Animal ethics has tended to follow an analytical approach and has focused much attention on moral reason and theory. Recently, some have argued this to be a fundamental problem. The 'paradigmatic account' claims that instead of reason and theory, ethics ought to emphasize common paradigms and meanings. Since these paradigms and meanings tend to be anthropocentric, the pro-animal arguments presented within animal ethics ought to be viewed critically. The paper explores two variants of this account: anthropocentric casuistry and the Wittgensteinian approach. It is maintained that, although the importance of paradigms and meanings ought to be recognized, both of these approaches face severe difficulties that make them, without further development, an unfruitful basis for ethics concerning non-human animals.

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