CRIMINALITY, PROSECUTORIAL SCREENING, AND UNCERTAINTY: TOWARD A THEORY OF DISCRETIONARY DECISION MAKING IN FELONY CASE PROCESSINGS

Abstract

This research contributes to a further understanding of the process of criminalization by examining case information that affects prosecuting attorneys' decision to continue felony prosecution following grand jury indictment. It is suggested that prosecuting attorneys, like other decision makers in organizations engaged in people‐processing activities, are confronted with uncertainty emerging from an inability to unilaterally exercise control over all actors involved in the transformation process. By relying on a self‐imposed decision criteria of prosecutorial merit defined as the likelihood of obtaining a jury trial conviction, prosecutors attempt to impose a “bounded rationality” on the exercise of discretion in screening decision making. This rationality is one that is sensitive to concerns for effective management of victims and witnesses. It is argued that information relevant to victim/witness credibility and/or cooperation in prosecution is brought to bear in deciding prosecutorial strategies of case processing. Therefore, it is hypothesized that, controlling for legal and extralegal variables, case information that decreases uncertainty concerning victim/witness management will increase the probability of continued prosecution. Support is found for this uncertainty avoidance thesis. In addition, the data indicate that prosecuting attorneys are less likely to continue prosecution of cases involving female defendants and are more likely to continue prosecution of defendants whose bail outcome includes financial conditions for release.

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