Articlebronze2015

The politics of performance measurement in China

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Public Policy and Administration Research China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance Public Administration in Developing Nations

Abstract

Performance measurement (PM) has been widely used in China's public sector to enhance performance and ensure accountability. Like in other countries, PM in China is an arena of political management and manipulation by which political priorities are articulated and political loyalty and responsiveness are sought. This paper develops a regime-centered analytical framework to understand the political nature of China's PM. It identifies major political structures that influence the adoption and functioning of PM in China, including the unified political and administrative system, the Chinese developmental state and its performance legitimacy strategy, the unitary but decentralized intergovernmental systems, and the bureaucratic culture and informal rules. Despite their constraining effects, these structural attributes of the Chinese political system fundamentally account for the rise and popularity of PM in China.

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References

1977Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony 1982MITI and the Japanese Miracle 2003Why Measure Performance? Different Purposes Require Different Measures 1992Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China 1981Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies 2004State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century 1999The Developmental State 1999The developmental state

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