Information, Ownership Structure, and Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Shareholder-Sponsored Corporate Governance Proposals

Lilli A. Gordon · John Pound

268 citations0/0 files storedThe Journal of Finance

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Corporate Finance and Governance Corporate Governance and Law Political Influence and Corporate Strategies

Abstract

ABSTRACT This paper examines how information and ownership structure affect voting outcomes on shareholder‐sponsored proposals to change corporate governance structure. We find that the outcomes of votes vary systematically with the governance and performance records of target firms, the identity of proposal sponsors, and the type of proposal. We also find that outcomes vary significantly as a function of ownership by insiders, institutions, outside blockholders, ESOPs, and outside directors who are blockholders. These results suggest that both public information and ownership structure have a significant influence on voting outcomes.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 268 citations exist upstream.

References

1988Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments 1988Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight 1987Shark repellents and stock prices

Cited by

2015Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation for Corporate Social Responsibility 2000Do occupational pension funds monitor companies in which they hold large stakes?2007Shareholder proposals in the new millennium: Shareholder support, board response, and market reaction 2000Of What Value Are Shareholder Proposals Sponsored by Public Pension Funds?2008Corporate Takeovers**Surveying the vast area of corporate takeovers is a daunting task, and we have undoubtedly missed many interesting contributions. We apologize to those who feel their research has been left out or improperly characterized, and welcome reactions and comments. Some of the material in Section 3 is also found in Eckbo (2008).2003The Emergence of Corporate Governance from Wall St. to Main St.: Outside Directors, Board Diversity, Earnings Management, and Managerial Incentives to Bear Risk 1999The Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund Activism 2007Vote Trading and Information Aggregation

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.