The European Community: A Balancing Act

Abstract

The European Community has traditionally been analyzed using theories and concepts drawn from international relations rather than from federalism. This article emphasizes the balance between the representation of territorial and nonterritorial interests in the Community and argues that concepts drawn from federalism can be useful in analytically understanding the Community as long as the American model of federalism is not viewed as the necessary federal referent. It describes the relative importance of the territorial dimension within the major Community institutions—the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Council, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice. The Court of Justice, it is argued, is particularly important in giving the Community a “federal” contour. However, its method of operation differentiates it in important ways from the American judiciary. The role of territorial politics within the Community is such that the Community's policymaking process, while unique, is certainly recognizable to students of comparative federalism.

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