Intentionality Via Intensions

Abstract

The philosophy of Husserl -to be explicit, phenomenology - is best understood as a particular kind of approach to the problem of intentionality. It was Brentano who brought to vogue the view that "acts" of consciousness-perceivings, believings, hopings, desirings, and so on-are intentional, i.e., directed toward objects. This view has been enshrined in the slogan, "Consciousness is consciousness of something." Phenomenol- ogy is an attempt to provide a theory of intentionality, explaining the nature of this property of consciousness. Husserl's explanation is characterized by its dependence on the postulation of a class of abstract entities called "noemata." Roughly, Husserl's theory of intentionality is that there is bound up with every act a certain "meaning," or "noema," in virtue of which the act is directed, or intentional. Our purpose will be to examine the nature of noemata and their role in the intentionality of acts. WATe shall argue that there is a remarkably strong connection between Husserl's \nnotion of noema, or act-meaning, and the more familiar concept of sense, or linguistic meaning. In fact, we argue, noemata are best understood as just the sort of intensional entities that have been both widely acclaimed and maligned among post-Fregean analytic philosophers.

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