In this article the authors develop a descriptive theory of choice using anticipated emotions. People are assumed to anticipate how they will feel about the outcomes of decisions and use their predictions to guide choice. The authors measure the pleasure associated with monetary outcomes of gambles and offer an account of judged pleasure called decision affect theory. Then they propose a theory of choices between gambles based on anticipated pleasure. People are assumed to choose the option with greater subjective expected pleasure. Similarities and differences between subjective expected pleasure theory and subjective expected utility theory are discussed. Emotions have powerful effects on choice. Our actual feelings of happiness, sadness, and anger both color and shape our decisions. In addition, our imagined feelings of guilt, elation, or regret influence our decisions. In this article we refer to these two influences as experienced emotions and anticipated emotions. Experienced emotions affect many levels of cognitive processing. When we are in good moods, we are better problem solvers (Isen, 1984, 1987, 1993), more likely to remember happy events (Bower, 1981), more risk seeking (Kahn & Isen, 1993), and more optimistic about the chances of favorable events (Wright & Bower, 1992; Nygren, Isen, Taylor, & Dulin, 1996). When we are in bad moods, we are more likely to recall negative events (Bower, 1981) and overestimate the chances of unfavorable events (Johnson & Tversky, 1983). If we are also aroused, we make less discriminate use of information
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