Is a Non-Normative Social Science Possible?

Abstract

A distinction is made between the notion of a value-free social science and a normative social science. It is argued that all social sciences start with normative notions stipulations about the nature of man, about society and the relation between man and society. It is argued that stipulations mostly are technical norms. In this respect they differ from equivalent common-sense notions which are postulated to be rules of the social game of acquiring knowledge. The consequences of such an approach is discussed. It is proposed that making initial stipulations explicit and discussing the social relevance of social scientific theories, creates fruitful cognitive dissonance which is absent in a strictly positivistic approach.

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